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Abstract
This paper studies the dynamic relationship between returns in the Russian stock market 
and global equity markets in the aftermath of the 2014 Ukrainian crisis. We apply dynamic 
JRRGQHVVRI¿W DQG ERRWVWUDSSHG UHJUHVVLRQ DSSURDFKHV WR VWXG\ WKHEHKDYLRU RI JOREDO
HTXLW\LQGLFHV2XUUHVXOWVUHYHDODVLJQL¿FDQWIDOOLQWKHGHJUHHRIV\QFKURQLFLW\EHWZHHQ
the Russian and global equity returns after the crisis outbreak. The Russian stock market 
clearly decoupled from both de veloped and emerging markets, as shown by a 30–50% 
decline in returns correlation. In view of dramatic increase in synchronicity across 
the Russian sectoral stock indices after the sanctions were introduced, our results suggest 
that the economic sanctions imposed on Russia during that period have effectively isolated 
the Russian equity market from the rest of the world and triggered extensive portfolio out-
ÀRZVIURPWKH5XVVLDQPDUNHW$VDUHVXOWRIWKHHFRQRPLFVDQFWLRQVDQGWKHOLPLWHGFKRLFH
of investments in Russia, the decreased co-movement between the Russian and global 
HTXLW\UHWXUQVLVXQOLNHO\WRSURYLGHLQYHVWRUVZLWKVXSHULRUGLYHUVL¿FDWLRQRSSRUWXQLWLHV
whilst the returns of the Russian market in the medium-term will likely continue to be pre-
dominately driven by idiosyncratic news.
1RQSUR¿WSDUWQHUVKLS³9RSURV\(NRQRPLNL´+RVWLQJE\(OVHYLHU%9$OOULJKWV
reserved.
-(/FODVVL¿FDWLRQ F30, E30, C32, F42.
.H\ZRUGV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1. Introduction
This paper is concerned with the effect of the ongoing Ukrainian crisis, and 
the resulting Western sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation, on the Russian 






stock market. Recently, Castagneto-Gissey and Nivorozhkin (2015) studied the ef-
fects of the political and security crisis in Ukraine on the co-movement between 
the Russian equity market and a large sample of international markets. Contrary to 
expectations, the results of this study did not reveal any increased co-movement 
between the Russian stock market return and returns in countries with relatively 
close economic ties to Russia. In fact, the decrease in returns correlation with 
the Russian stock market occurred rather uniformly across developed, emerging, 
and frontier markets, regardless of the strength of economic links with Russia. 
The degree of co-movement between developed, emerging, and frontier stock 
PDUNHWV DQG WKH5XVVLDQ VWRFNPDUNHW GHFUHDVHG VLJQL¿FDQWO\ LQ DERXW RI
FDVHVZLWKWKHGHFUHDVHLQFRUUHODWLRQUDQJLQJIURPWR6XFKRYHUZKHOP-
ing evidence, obtained using a range of advanced time-series techniques, indi-
cated that the Russian equity market had largely decoupled from global equity 
markets in the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis.1 In relation to the stock market, it 
appeared that the political and economic sanctions imposed on Russia were suc-
cessful in generating idiosyncratic shocks for the country whilst yielding limited 
repercussions on the rest of the world.
This paper provides further insights into the issue of the Russian stock market 
decoupling from global markets in the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis by adopt-
LQJWKHFRHI¿FLHQWRIGHWHUPLQDWLRQR-squared) of the market model as a measure 
of synchronicity of stock price movements. We further check the robustness of 
our results by applying a bootstrapped regression approach to the market model.
Earlier results indicate that R-squared statistics of the market model tended to 
EHLQYHUVHO\UHODWHGWRWKHOHYHORI¿QDQFLDOGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHFRXQWULHV0RUFN
et al. (2000) show that the average R-VTXDUHGDWWKH¿UPOHYHOWHQGVWREHKLJKHU
LQFRXQWULHVZLWKUHODWLYHO\ORZSHUFDSLWD*'3DQGOHVVGHYHORSHG¿QDQFLDOV\V-
tems. The authors suggest that the leading explanation for the observed phenom-
enon is the relatively low number of informed traders relative to noise traders in 
the countries with poor protection of investors’ property rights, which could make 
WUDGHVEDVHGRQ¿UPVSHFL¿FLQIRUPDWLRQOHVVXVHIXO$VH[SHFWHGZHREVHUYHG
a higher R-squared in models of emerging markets than developed markets, pre-
VXPDEO\GXHWR³KHUGLQJ´EHKDYLRURILQYHVWRUVZKLFKPDNHVWKHPPRUHOLNHO\WR
IRFXVRQFRXQWULHVUDWKHUWKDQLQGLYLGXDOVWRFNVLQWUDGLQJDFWLYLWLHV-LQDQG0\HUV
H[WHQG WKHDUJXPHQWRI0RUFNHWDO DQGDVVHUW WKDWVRPHGHJUHH
RIRSDTXHQHVVRUODFNRIWUDQVSDUHQF\DWWKH¿UPOHYHODQGLPSHUIHFWSURWHFWLRQ
for investors are mutually reinforcing as, for example, one would not expect per-
IHFWSURWHFWLRQRILQYHVWRUVLQDQRSDTXH¿UP$VH[SHFWHGWKHDXWKRUV¿QGWKDW




ated with the Russian stock market, which coincided in many cases with the appearance of asymmetric effects.
 2 +XWWRQHWDOLQYHVWLJDWHWKHUHODWLRQEHWZHHQWKHWUDQVSDUHQF\RI¿QDQFLDOVWDWHPHQWVDQGWKHGLVWUL
EXWLRQRIVWRFNUHWXUQV8VLQJHDUQLQJVPDQDJHPHQWDVDPHDVXUHRIRSDFLW\WKH\¿QGWKDWRSDFLW\LVDVVRFLDWHG
with higher R2V LQGLFDWLQJ OHVV UHYHODWLRQRI¿UPVSHFL¿F LQIRUPDWLRQ0RUHRYHURSDTXH¿UPVZHUH IRXQG
WREHPRUHSURQHWRVWRFNSULFHFUDVKHVFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHSUHGLFWLRQRIWKH-LQDQG0\HUV&KDQDQG
+DPHHG XVHG WKHR-squared statistics of the market model to examine the relation between the stock 




tries could also explain the observed patterns in smaller or less-developed markets. 
This paper does not attempt to explain the cross-sectional variation in the de-
gree of synchronicity, focusing instead on explaining the variation of this mea-
sure over time in a single country, Russia. Using the equity market indices pro-
YLGHG E\ 0RUJDQ 6WDQOH\ &DSLWDO ,QWHUQDWLRQDO ,QF 06&, DQG 'DWDVWUHDP
*OREDO(TXLW\ ,QGLFHVZH VKRZ WKDW WKHLQÀXHQFH RI WKHZRUOG VWRFNPDUNHWV
on the Russian stock market had considerably decreased in the aftermath of 




class as the Russian market. Our results are consistent with the hypothesized ef-
fect of economic sanctions imposed on Russia, which produced an idiosyncratic 
shock and effectively isolated the Russian market. 
While still being regarded as a major emerging market, the Russian stock mar-
NHW¶VGHFOLQLQJFDSLWDOL]DWLRQDQGIUHHÀRDWOHGWRDGUDPDWLFIDOOLQ5XVVLD¶VZHLJKW
LQLQYHVWDEOHHTXLW\LQGLFHVVXFKDVWKH06&,(PHUJLQJ0DUNHWV,QGH['HVSLWH
the attractive valuations in the Russian equity market,3 the choice of available 
investments remains limited due to the sanctions imposed on the country, as re-
FHQWO\VXJJHVWHGE\0DUN0RELXV([HFXWLYH&KDLUPDQRI7HPSOHWRQ(PHUJLQJ
0DUNHWV*URXS4$VDUHVXOWWKHGHFUHDVLQJFRPRYHPHQWRIWKH5XVVLDQVWRFN
market with the rest of the world is unlikely to provide international investors 
ZLWKVXSHULRUGLYHUVL¿FDWLRQRSSRUWXQLWLHV2QWKHRWKHUKDQGLIWKHVDQFWLRQVDUH
OLIWHGDODUJHÀRZRIHTXLW\SRUWIROLRLQYHVWPHQWVLVOLNHO\WREHREVHUYHG
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 introduces the main 
details related to the Ukrainian crisis, section 3 depicts a preliminary analysis of 
the data and is followed by a presentation of the empirical methodology used in 
WKHSDSHULQVHFWLRQ6HFWLRQSUHVHQWVWKHPDLQUHVXOWVWKHUHDIWHUGLVFXVVHGLQ
section 6. Finally, concluding remarks are presented in section 6.
2. The Ukrainian crisis and the Russian stock market 
From the perspective of Russia’s involvement in Ukrainian affairs and its ef-
fect on the Russian economy and capital markets, the Ukrainian crisis can be 
WUDFHGEDFNWR0DUFKZKHQWKH5XVVLDQ3DUOLDPHQWDSSURYHG3UHVLGHQW
3XWLQ¶VUHTXHVWWRXVHDUPHGIRUFHVLQ8NUDLQHWRSURWHFW5XVVLDQLQWHUHVWV6KRUWO\
afterwards, Crimea’s secession referendum on joining Russia, widely viewed 
DVLOOHJLWLPDWHZDVFRQGXFWHGRQ0DUFKDQGRQ0DUFKDELOOWRDEVRUE












opment of the Russian Federation was heavily affected by the consequences of 
WKHSROLWLFDODQGVHFXULW\FULVLVLQ8NUDLQH$OUHDG\LQ0DUFKWKH8NUDLQLDQ
crisis prompted a number of governments to apply sanctions against individuals , 
EXVLQHVVHVDQGRI¿FLDOVIURP5XVVLDIROORZHGE\VHYHUDOURXQGVRIHYHUWLJKWHU
VDQFWLRQV DSSURYHGE\ WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV WKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQDVZHOO DVRWKHU
countries and international organizations. In addition to diplomatic actions, 
WKHPHDVXUHVLQFOXGHGWUDYHOEDQVDQGDVVHWIUHH]HVDJDLQVW5XVVLDQRI¿FLDOVLQ-
cluding a broad set of measures targeting sectoral cooperation and exchanges 
with Russia, as well as additional measures concerning general economic coop-
eration. In particular, Russian state banks were excluded from raising long-term 
loans, bans were implemented on arms deals, exports of dual-use equipment for 
PLOLWDU\XVHDQGDQ(886EDQWDUJHWHGH[SRUWVRIVRPHRLOLQGXVWU\WHFKQRORJ\
and services, to name a few. 
8QVXUSULVLQJO\ WKHXQGHUGLYHUVL¿HG DQG KLJKO\ FRQFHQWUDWHG QDWXUH RI
the Russian economy, characterized by pervasive state control, led to a devastat-
ing effect of sanctions beyond the targeted sectors. The effect of the sanctions on 
the Russian economy was exacerbated by reciprocal sanctions and embargos, which 




been instrumental in the Russian threat to Ukraine’s sovereignty can be subdi-
YLGHGLQWRWKUHHURXQGV7KH¿UVWURXQGRIVDQFWLRQVZDVLPSRVHGLQ0DUFK$SULO
WKHVHFRQGURXQGEHJDQRQ$SULOZKLOHWKHWKLUGURXQGRIVDQF-
tions dates from July 2014 to the present day. 
The sanctions imposed on Russia and the list of countries joining the sanctions 
kept on increasing in each round. International organizations, such as the European 
%DQN IRU 5HFRQVWUXFWLRQ DQG'HYHORSPHQW (%5' IUR]H DOO QHZ SURMHFWV LQ
5XVVLDZLWKDQXPEHURIFRXQWULHVMRLQLQJWKLVSROLF\5XVVLD¶V¿QDQFLDOHQHUJ\
and defense sectors were subjected to increasingly tougher international sanctions 
and a large number of Russian companies became limited in their ability to access 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOGHEWPDUNHWVDQGLQWHFKQRORJ\FRRSHUDWLRQ%\)HEUXDU\
the sanction list of the EU covered 151 individuals and 37 entities.
:KHQ LW FRPHV WR WKH5XVVLDQ VWRFN PDUNHW WKH06&, 5XVVLD ,QGH[ KDG
DOUHDG\ EHHQ GRZQ E\ DOPRVW  DW WKHEHJLQQLQJ RI  ZKHQ WKH¿UVW
round of sanctions was introduced and actually recovered some of the losses 
in the period until the beginning of November 2014 (see Fig. 1). The negative 
PRQWKO\UHWXUQVRILQ0DUFKDQGLQ$SULOZHUHIROORZHGE\SRVLWLYH
UHWXUQVRILQ0D\DQGLQ-XQHEHIRUHWXUQLQJQHJDWLYHIRUWKHUHVW
of the year.6 This could be interpreted as either evidence of limited effect of 
sanctions on the Russian stock market or the investors effectively anticipating 






rates against the ruble, which started in July 2014 together with the third wave 




again a lack of any profound effect of sanctions in terms of valuation. In the sub-
sequent period, the stock market fall reached dramatic proportions, returning 
QHJDWLYHLQPLG'HFHPEHUIURPWKHVWDUWRIWKH\HDUDQG¿QLVKLQJWKH\HDU
62% down (see Fig. 1). 
This casual observation cannot rule out the negative effect of Western sanc-
tions on the Russian stock market but the timing of the stock market decline 
seems to be more consistent with the negative effect of deteriorating macroeco-
QRPLFLQGLFDWRUVWKHRLOSULFHGHFOLQHDQGWKHVHOILPSRVHG³IRRGHPEDUJR´
In 2015, the recovery of the Russian equity market, which lasted until mid-
0D\PDGHLWRQHRIWKHEHVWSHUIRUPLQJVWRFNPDUNHWVLQWKHZRUOGEXWWKHJDLQV
effectively disappeared by the end of summer 2015, with the market remaining 
about 52% down relative to the start of 2014. Nevertheless, from a historical 
SHUVSHFWLYHWKH5XVVLDQPDUNHWVWLOOSHUIRUPHGEHWWHUWKDQWKH06&,$&:RUOG
WKH06&,(PHUJLQJ0DUNHWVDQGWKH06&,%5,&UHWXUQLQJLQH[FHVVRI
in dollar terms since the beginning of 2001 (see Fig. 2).
3. Data and descriptive statistics
:H HPSOR\ WKHHTXLW\PDUNHW LQGLFHV SURYLGHG E\0RUJDQ 6WDQOH\ &DSLWDO
,QWHUQDWLRQDO,QF06&,7 Thousands of organizations worldwide currently use 
WKH06&,LQWHUQDWLRQDOHTXLW\EHQFKPDUNVIRULQYHVWLQJWULOOLRQVRIGROODUVWKXV
the choice of indices can be viewed as appropriate for the aims of this paper.
 7 06&,LVDOHDGLQJSURYLGHURIHTXLW\¿[HGLQFRPHDQGKHGJHIXQGLQGLFHV7KHGHVLJQDQGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ









23 developed and 23 emerging market countries. With 2,477 constituents, the in-
GH[FRYHUVDSSUR[LPDWHO\RIWKHJOREDOLQYHVWDEOHHTXLW\RSSRUWXQLW\VHW
7KH06&,5XVVLD,QGH[LVGHVLJQHGWRPHDVXUHWKHSHUIRUPDQFHRIWKHODUJH





tion in each country. 
7KH06&,%5,&,QGH[LVDIUHHÀRDWDGMXVWHGPDUNHWFDSLWDOL]DWLRQZHLJKW-
ed index that is designed to measure the equity market performance across 
WKH(PHUJLQJ0DUNHWVFRXQWU\LQGLFHV%UD]LO5XVVLD,QGLDDQG&KLQD:LWK
302 constituents, the index covers approximately the same proportion of free 
ÀRDWDGMXVWHGPDUNHWFDSLWDOL]DWLRQLQHDFKFRXQWU\
The data on the sectoral indices is from the Datastream Global Equity Indices. 
This family of indices forms a comprehensive, independent standard for equity 
research and benchmarking. For each market, a representative sample of stocks 
FRYHULQJDPLQLPXP±RIWRWDOPDUNHWFDSLWDOLVDWLRQHQDEOHVPDUNHWLQGL-
ces to be calculated. Within each market, stocks are allocated to industrial sectors 
XVLQJWKH,QGXVWU\&ODVVL¿FDWLRQ%HQFKPDUN,&%MRLQWO\FUHDWHGE\)76(DQG
'RZ-RQHV6HFWRULQGLFHVDUHWKHQFDOFXODWHG
We construct daily continuously compounded return series based on the total 
return indices, which account for reinvested dividends (see Fig. 1 and Fig. 2). 
The observation period starts at the beginning of 2001 when the daily returns for 
WKH06&,5XVVLD,QGH[EHFDPHDYDLODEOH









FULVLV´ SHULRG $XJXVW  WR  )HEUXDU\  DQG ³WKHFULVLV SHULRG´
0DUFK WR6HSWHPEHU UHYHDOV DGHFUHDVH LQ WKHIRUPHU DQGDQ
increase in the latter for all indices. 
The next section examines the empirical methodologies employed in this paper 
to disentangle the dynamic relation between returns in the Russian market and 
the global equity markets considered.
4. Empirical methodology
In order to understand the impact of world stock market returns on Russian 




ther investigate the change in co-movement between the Russian stock market 
and global equity markets in the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis. 
 '\QDPLFJRRGQHVVRI¿WDQDO\VLV
2XUPHDVXUHRIVWRFNSULFHV\QFKURQLFLW\IROORZV0RUFNHWDO:HHV-
timate the linear regression equation (1)
Rt ȕ0  +  ȕ1 Rm,t  +  İt (1)
where Rt LV WKHUHWXUQ RI WKH06&, 5XVVLDQ VWRFN LQGH[ RQ GD\ t and Rm,t is 
the global market return, m, at day t.
$VLQ0RUFNHWDOV\QFKURQLFLW\FDQEHGH¿QHGE\HTXDWLRQDV
SYNCHt = log (1 –  R2R
2 ) (2) 
where R2LVWKHFRHI¿FLHQWRIGHWHUPLQDWLRQIURPWKHHVWLPDWLRQRIIRU06&,
Russia on day t. SYNCHt is measured for a market based on the daily return ob-
Table 1
Descriptive statistics for daily index returns.
0HDQ 6WGGHY $')
Pre-crisis Period
06&,$&:RUOG 0.000673 0.00611 P < 0.001
06&,(0 0.000027  P < 0.001
06&,%5,& –0.000044  P < 0.001
06&,586 –0.000223 0.01135 P < 0.001
Crisis Period
06&,$&:RUOG –0.0000619 0.00670 P < 0.001
06&,(0 –0.0003949  P < 0.001
06&,%5,& –0.0003401 0.01120 P < 0.001
06&,586 –0.0009649 0.02400 P < 0.001
6RXUFHV7KRPVRQ5HXWHUV'DWDVWUHDP$XWKRUV¶FDOFXODWLRQV
30 (1LYRUR]KNLQ*&DVWDJQHWR*LVVH\5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
VHUYDWLRQVRIWKH\HDU$KLJKSYNCHt indicates that the Russian market is highly 
correlated with global markets.
4.2. Bootstrapped analysis
In order to provide a more accurate measure of the impact of global equity markets 
on the Russian market, we complement the previous analysis with a bootstrapped re-
JUHVVLRQSURFHGXUH%RRWVWUDSSLQJLVDVLPXODWLRQPHWKRGXVHGIRUIUHTXHQWLVWLQIHU-
ence and is based on random sampling with replacement, which enables the estima-
tion of the properties of an estimator when sampling from an approximate distribution 
(Efron and Tibshirani, 1994), which may be optimal in this case given the relatively 
short sample period in our case. It is convenient to employ this technique because 
it does not require distributional assumptions, including normally distributed errors. 
Furthermore, the bootstrap is able to deliver more accurate results when the data are 
QRWZHOOEHKDYHGDVLQRXUFDVHRUZKHQWKHVDPSOHVL]HLVVPDOO$OWKRXJKWKHSRVW
crisis period used in this paper is longer than the one used by Castagneto-Gissey and 
Nivorozhkin (2015), the sample may still not be considered large, thus indicating 
RXUPHWKRGDVDMXVWL¿HGDSSURDFKWRRYHUFRPHWKLVLVVXH7KHDGRSWHGDSSURDFKDO-
lows us to avoid a number of assumptions of parametric models made in Castagneto-
*LVVH\DQG1LYRUR]KNLQZKRXVHGGLIIHUHQWW\SHVRI*$5&+PRGHOV:H
XVHWKHSHUFHQWLOHPHWKRGWR\LHOGWKHFRQ¿GHQFHLQWHUYDOVRIWKHHVWLPDWRUDV
[șĮ/2,  ș1– Į/2] (3)
where șp  is the pth quantile of the bootstrap distribution (ș ƹ1, ...,  ș ƹk:HVSHFL¿HG
z0 as
z0  =  ׋–1{ k[ nN (i)n1 (i) (ș ƹiș ƹ  )]} (4) 
where n is the number of elements of i,  nN (i)n1 (i) (ș ƹiș ƹ  ) represents the number of 
elements in the bootstrap distribution which are less than or equal to the observed 
statistic, ׋ stands for the standard cumulative normal and z0 is the median bias 
of ș ƹ0RUHRYHUOHW
a  =  
6[ni =1(ș Ǌ(.)  –  ș ƹ(i) )2]3/2
ni =1(ș Ǌ(.)  –  ș ƹ(i) )
3
 (5) 
where a is the jack-knife acceleration estimate for ș ƹ, ș ƹ(i) are the leave-one-out, or 
jackknife, estimates of ș Ǌ(.), and ș ƹ(i) represents the estimates’ mean value. In addition, 
p1 ׋{z0  +  1 –  Į(z0  –  z1– Į/2 )z0  –  z1– Į/2 } (6) 
p2 ׋{z0  +  1 –  Į(z0  –  z1– Į/2 )z0 +  z1– Į/2 } (6) 
where z1– Į/2 represents the (1 –  Į/2)th quantile of the normal distribution.
31(1LYRUR]KNLQ*&DVWDJQHWR*LVVH\5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
:HXVHWKHERRWVWUDSSHGUHJUHVVLRQLQZKLFKWKH06&,5XVVLD,QGH[UHWXUQLV
a function of the global index return series. The regression is estimated with data 
IURPWKHSUHFULVLVSHULRG$XJXVWWR)HEUXDU\DQGWKHFULVLV
SHULRG 0DUFK WR6HSWHPEHU2XUDLP LV WRGHULYH WKHUHODWLYH
FRHI¿FLHQWVRIYDULDWLRQWRSURYLGHLQIHUHQFHVUHJDUGLQJWKHFKDQJLQJLPSDFWRI
global equity markets returns on Russian stock returns over the two periods.
5. Results
This section provides the results of our investigation. The dynamic goodness 
RI ¿W SUR¿OH RI WKH5XVVLDQ HTXLW\ LQGH[ UHWXUQ DV H[SODLQHG E\ JOREDO HTXLW\
indices returns is presented hereafter (section 5.1), and is complemented by our 




(e.g., De Nicolo and Kwast, 2002), the dynamic R2 series were calculated using 
a rolling 262-day, or one year, window starting on 31 December 2001 to calcu-
late the daily R2.9
The R2DQGRXUPHDVXUHRIV\QFKURQL]DWLRQ6<1&+t GH¿QHGLQUHODWLYHWR
WKHZRUOGHPHUJLQJDQG%5,&PDUNHWVDUHUHSRUWHGLQWKH¿JXUHVEHORZ)LJV±
The degree of synchronization of the Russian stock market with the rest of 
the world reveals a dramatic decline in the level of co-movement between 
WKH06&,5XVVLD,QGH[DQGWKH06&,$&:RUOGWKH06&,(PHUJLQJ0DUNHWV
DQGHYHQWKH06&,%5,&LQGLFHVVLQFHWKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKH8NUDLQLDQFULVLVVHH
Figs. 3–6). The average monthly R2 RIWKH06&,5XVVLDDQGWKH06&,$&:RUOG
indices daily returns declined by almost 50% from the peak of 39% in February 
2014 to the throw of 19% in December 2014. The average monthly R2 remained in 
the range of 19–22% since July 2014 until the end of the sample period. 
7KHIDOOVLQWKHGHJUHHVRIV\QFKURQLFLW\RIWKH5XVVLDQPDUNHWZLWKWKH06&,
(PHUJLQJ0DUNHWV DQG WKH06&, %5,&ZHUH DOVR YHU\ VLJQL¿FDQW 7KHDYHU-
age monthly R2 RIWKH06&,5XVVLDDQGWKH06&,(PHUJLQJ0DUNHWVGROODUUH-
turns declined by 40% from the peak of 50% in January and February 2009 to 
the throw of 30% in December, remaining in the range of 30–36% until the end 
of the sample period. 
The average monthly R2 RI WKH06&,5XVVLDDQG WKH06&,%5,&GROODU UH-
turns declined by over 40% from the peak of 47% in January and February 2009 
WRWKHWKURZRILQ'HFHPEHUUHPDLQLQJLQWKHUDQJHRI±XQWLOWKHHQG
of the sample period. 
The decline in all of the R2 statistics in the crisis period is strongly statistically 
VLJQL¿FDQWUHODWLYHWRWKHPHDQYDOXHLQ7KHGHFOLQHZDVDOVRVLJQL¿FDQWLQ
the period before July 2014, when the oil price began declining and the Russian 
macroeconomic indicators began deteriorating.
  1RWHWKDWZHHNHQGVDUHQRWLQFOXGHGLQWKH06&,GDWD
 9 The results of the paper remain qualitatively similar when alternative rolling windows were used.
32 (1LYRUR]KNLQ*&DVWDJQHWR*LVVH\5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFV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The low level of synchronicity of the Russian stock market with the rest of 






prior to the Ukrainian crisis. For example, the R2 ZLWK06&,$&:RUOGZDVRQDGH-
clining trend since December 2011 when it reached its maximum value of 66%. 
Fig. 4.5ROOLQJGD\ZLQGRZHVWLPDWHVRIFRHI¿FLHQWVRIGHWHUPLQDWLRQR-squared)  
RIWKHPDUNHWPRGHOIRUWKH06&,(PHUJLQJ0DUNHWV,QGH[DQG06&,5XVVLD,QGH[ 




Fig. 3.5ROOLQJGD\ZLQGRZHVWLPDWHVRIFRHI¿FLHQWVRIGHWHUPLQDWLRQR-squared)  
RIWKHPDUNHWPRGHOIRUWKH06&,$&:RUOG,QGH[DQG06&,5XVVLD,QGH[ 





Overall, it appears that, although the Ukrainian crisis cannot be ruled out as 
a contributing factor affecting the synchronicity of the Russian stock market, 
there are clearly other factors at play. 
Given our use of daily equity returns, it is not feasible to test the effect of 
macroeconomic and institutional indicators on the behavior of the Russian stock 
market. Therefore, we look at the behavior of the sectoral stock indices. Global 
equity indices from Thomson Reuters are available for nine Russian indus-
WULHVQDPHO\%DVLF0DWHULDOV GHQRWHG%0$7LQ)LJVDDQGE&RQVXPHU
*RRGV&160*&RQVXPHU6HUYLFHV&160+HDOWK&DUH+/7+)LQDQFLDOV
Fig. 5.5ROOLQJGD\ZLQGRZHVWLPDWHVRIFRHI¿FLHQWVRIGHWHUPLQDWLRQR-squared)  
RIWKHPDUNHWPRGHOIRUWKH06&,%5,&,QGH[DQG06&,5XVVLD,QGH[ 
in the period -DQXDU\±6HSWHPEHU.










),1$1 ,QGXVWULHV ,1'86 2LO DQG *DV 2,/* 7HOHFRP 7(/& DQG
8WLOLWLHV87,/$OO LQGLFHVDUHGDLO\ WRWDOUHWXUQVGHQRPLQDWHGLQ86GROODUV
Our hypothesis is that the effect of the Ukrainian crisis and the Western sanctions 
on the synchronicity of the Russian stock market would be indirectly revealed 
through the increase in co-movement of the sectoral index returns. This would 
DOVREHFRQVLVWHQWZLWKD³ÀLJKWWRTXDOLW\´SKHQRPHQRQRFFXUULQJZKHQLQYHV-
tors sell what they perceive to be higher-risk investments and turn to safer invest-
ments (see e.g., Eichengreen et al., 2001). 
The results in Fig. 7 and Table 2 reveal a dramatic change in the behavior 
of the sectoral stock indices. The wildly varying and often negative correlation 











period (Fig. 7a and Table 2a). Importantly, the increase in the index co-movement 
was particularly consistent, with strong positive correlation persisting in the pe-
riod before July 2014, when the oil price started to decline and ruble exchange 
rates began to weaken. 
The behavior of the basic materials sector represents an important exception 
and sheds further light on the impact of sanctions. The basic materials sector 
represents the stocks of companies involved in the discovery, development and 
SURFHVVLQJRIUDZPDWHULDOV7KHVHFWRULQFOXGHVWKHPLQLQJDQGUH¿QLQJRIPHW-
DOVFKHPLFDOSURGXFHUVDQGIRUHVWU\SURGXFWV$FFRUGLQJWRDQXPEHURIH[SHUWV
the probability of any sanctions directly impacting the Russian metals and min-
ing sector is very low.10 Even if further sanctions are introduced, Russian compa-
nies are likely to be able to diversify their exports to other markets and may even 
EHQH¿WEHFDXVHPDUNHWSULFHVFRXOGULVHVLJQL¿FDQWO\LQVXFKVLWXDWLRQ0RUHRYHU
GHVSLWHWKHUHVWULFWLRQRQDFFHVVWRWKH(XURSHDQDQG$PHULFDQHTXLW\PDUNHWV





(obtained from the Thomson Reuters Datastream global equity indices)  
LQWKHSHULRGD-DQXDU\±6HSWHPEHUDQGE-DQXDU\±'HFHPEHU
(a)
Index %0$7 &160 &160* +/7+ ),1$1 ,1'86 2,/* 7(/& 87,/
%0$7 1.00 0.37 0.13 0.12 0.25  0.39 0.21 0.31
&160 1.00    0.93   0.90
&160* 1.00 0.96 0.95 0.92 0.94 0.97 0.96
+/7+ 1.00  0.94 0.90 0.94 0.93
),1$1 1.00  0.96 0.97 0.97
,1'86 1.00 0.94 0.94 0.97




Index %0$7 &160 &160* +/7+ ),1$1 ,1'86 2,/* 7(/& 87,/
%0$7 1.00 –0.71 0.95 0.46 0.93 0.73 0.51 –0.37 0.92
&160 1.00 –0.75 –0.67 –0.53 –0.42 0.07  ±
&160* 1.00 0.63 0.92 0.66  –0.44 0.90
+/7+ 1.00 0.50 0.21 ± –0.64 0.50
),1$1 1.00 0.74 0.54 –0.21 
,1'86 1.00 0.55 –0.13 








stock markets.11 Unlike other sectoral indices, the basic materials sectoral index 
UHPDLQHGHIIHFWLYHO\ÀDWGXULQJWKHFULVLVSHULRGDQGLWVFRUUHODWLRQZLWKRWKHU
sectoral indices was in the range of 12–37%. 
2YHUDOO WKHLQFUHDVHGV\QFKURQLFLW\ LQRXWRI5XVVLDQVHFWRUDOVWRFNLQ-
dices is consistent with the negative impact of sanctions, which triggered wide-
VSUHDGSRUWIROLRRXWÀRZVIURPWKHPDUNHWRUD³ÀLJKWWRTXDOLW\´SKHQRPHQRQ
mentioned earlier and frequently observed during the emerging markets crisis 
(Rösch and Kaserer, 2013). 
$FFRUGLQJWR)LJ WKHYRODWLOLW\RIGDLO\UHWXUQVLQWKH5XVVLDQVWRFNPDU-
ket has been steadily increasing from the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis but 
remained rather moderate from a historical perspective, despite increasing at 
the end of the observation period, particularly in dollar terms. Using the standard 
DSSURDFKHJ'HUUDELDQG/HVHXUH)LJGHFRPSRVHVWKHWRWDOYDULDQFH
of daily returns into systematic and residual (unsystematic) components. The sys-
tematic risk component is a proportion of the total variance of daily stock returns 
RIWKH06&,5XVVLDH[SODLQHGE\WKHPDUNHWPRGHOZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKH06&,$&
World Index, and unsystematic risk refers to the unexplained part of the variance 
WKHUHVLGXDO YDULDQFH 6WULNLQJO\ WKHOHYHO RI XQV\VWHPDWLF ULVN RYHUWRRN WKDW
of systematic risk in July 2014 and the wedge between the two risk components 
kept on increasing during the observation period. With the exception of the glob-
DO¿QDQFLDOFULVLVSHULRGVXFKKLJKPDJQLWXGHRIXQV\VWHPDWLFULVNZDVRQO\RE-
served in 2001–2002 when the Russian stock market was hardly on the radars of 
international portfolio managers. The timing of the relative increase in the idio-
syncratic risk component is also considerably similar to the changes in synchron-
 11 5HFHQWVXFFHVVIXO UH¿QDQFLQJRI(95$=IRU86'PLOOLRQFDUULHGRXWE\ LQWHUQDWLRQDOV\QGLFDWHRI
'HXWVFKH%DQN$*5DLIIHLVHQ%DQN,QWHUQDWLRQDO$*,1*%DQN191RUGHD%DQN6RFLpWp*pQpUDOHDQG
Rosbank can be interpreted as a proof that sanctions against mining and metals industry as a whole and indi-






icity of the Russian market with the rest of the world. Consistent with the cross-
VHFWLRQDOHYLGHQFHIURPWKHSUHYLRXVVWXGLHV0RUFNHWDOWKHORZGHJUHH
RI V\QFKURQLFLW\ WHQGV WR EH DVVRFLDWHGZLWK WKHODUJHU DPRXQW RI XQYHUL¿DEOH






the Russian market had been associated with the appearance of trends similar to 
WKHRQHVREVHUYHGLQWKH³SUHLQWHJUDWLRQ´SHULRG
$FFRUGLQJ WR +VLQ DQG 7VHQJ  VWRFN SULFH V\QFKURQLFLW\ PD\ YDU\
DV\PPHWULFDOO\GHSHQGLQJRQPDUNHWFRQGLWLRQV7KHDXWKRUV¿QGWKDWSULFHV\Q-
chronicities tend to be stronger in bearish markets and interpret this as being 
consistent with the hypothesis that investors have increased loss aversion in bear 
PDUNHWVZKLFKIXUWKHUOLPLWVLQIRUPHGDUELWUDJH7KHUHVXOWVIRUWKHJOREDO
¿QDQFLDOFULVLVSHULRGVHHPWREHFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKDW¿QGLQJ2QWKHRWKHUKDQG
the decreased synchronicity of the Russian market during the Ukrainian crisis ac-
companied by large negative returns highlights the importance of controlling for 
exogenous factors, in our case represented by the economic sanctions imposed 
on Russia.
7KHV\QFKURQLFLW\ RI WKH06&,5XVVLD UHWXUQ WHQGV WR EHKLJKO\ FRUUHODWHG
with the cumulative return of the index. In fact, the correlation was in excess 
of 50% for the period since 2001, as well as for the more recent period since 
the beginning of 2014, associated with the Ukrainian crisis. The volatile port-
IROLR FDSLWDO ÀRZV WR WKH5XVVLDQ VWRFNPDUNHW DQG WKHHPHUJLQJPDUNHWV LQ
 12 Otherwise, the correlation for the whole sample is –5%. 
Fig. 9. Rolling 262-days window estimates of the proportions of systematic and unsystematic risk of 
WKH06&,5XVVLD,QGH[ZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKH06&,$&:RUOG,QGH[ 




JHQHUDODUH OLNHO\ WREH UHVSRQVLEOH IRU WKH¿QGLQJ ,Q WKHWLPHRIERRPV ID-
YRUDEOH YDOXDWLRQ GXH WR D SRWHQWLDOO\ GLYHUVL¿DEOH FRPSRQHQW RI XQV\VWHP-
atic risk of the market, drives returns up, leading to an increased integration of 
the Russian market with the rest of the world, thereby increasing the synchroni-
city of the stock returns as the marginal investor is likely to become represented 
E\DIRUHLJQHQWLW\KROGLQJDQLQWHUQDWLRQDOO\GLYHUVL¿HGSRUWIROLR,QWKHWLPHRI
bust, as in the current period, the opposite situation emerges, with the Russian 
market effectively decoupling from the rest of the world and returns predomi-
nately being driven by idiosyncratic news.
This evidence is consistent with literature on the implications of partial seg-
PHQWDWLRQZKLFKLVGH¿QHGDVWKHVLWXDWLRQLQZKLFK³WKHUHDUHVRPHHTXLW\ÀRZV
WKDW WDNH SODFH HLWKHU LQ RU RXW RI D FRXQWU\ DOWKRXJK WKHVH ÀRZV DUH OLPLWHG
because of explicit constraints on, or because of barriers to, international invest-
PHQW´.DURO\L DQG6WXO]7KHFRQFOXVLYHHPSLULFDOHYLGHQFHRQWKHGLI-
ference between global pricing of assets to local pricing exists for a number of 
countries where some of the barriers to international investment are known ex-
SOLFLWO\HJ(UUXQ]DDQG/RVT+LHWDOD%DLOH\DQG-DJWLDQL
7KHFRPPRQUHVXOWVRIWKHSDSHUVDUHWKDWPDUNHWVHJPHQWDWLRQVLJQL¿FDQWO\DI-
fects valuation of equities and that the premium of shares available to foreign 
investors varies over time. 
5.2. Bootstrapped analysis
The bootstrapped analysis unveils the impact of world stock market returns on 
Russian stock returns before and after the Ukrainian crisis. Table 3 depicts the re-
sults of our bootstrapped regression analysis. The results in Table 3 once more 
FRQ¿UPDVXEVWDQWLDOGHFOLQHLQWKHGHJUHHRIV\QFKURQLFLW\EHWZHHQWKH5XVVLDQ




set class as the Russian market, appear to credibly indicate the idiosyncratic ef-
fect of the Ukrainian crisis and a broad decoupling of the Russian market from 




Pseudo R2 t ¨Pseudo R2 (%)
06&,$&:RUOG Pre-crisis  14.27 ±
Crisis 0.1229*** 14.41
06&,%5,& Pre-crisis 0.2456*** 9.01 –32.45
Crisis 0.1659*** 







This paper studies the dynamic relationship between the Russian stock mar-
ket and a representative sample of global markets in the aftermath of the 2014 
8NUDLQLDQFULVLV%\DSSO\LQJG\QDPLFJRRGQHVVRI¿WDQGERRWVWUDSSHGUHJUHVVLRQ
DSSURDFKHVZHVKRZWKDWWKHLQÀXHQFHRIWKHZRUOGVWRFNPDUNHWVRQWKH5XVVLDQ
stock market considerably decreased in the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis. 
The decrease in co-movement of Russian equity market returns in the magnitude 
of 30–50% is observed not only with respect to global equity returns, but also 
ZLWKUHVSHFWWRHPHUJLQJDQG%5,&PDUNHWVZKLFKEHORQJWRWKHVDPH³HPHUJLQJ
PDUNHWV´ DVVHWFODVVDVWKH5XVVLDQPDUNHW,QYLHZRIGUDPDWLFLQFUHDVHLQV\Q-
chronicity across the Russian sectoral stock indices after the sanctions were intro-
duced, our results are consistent with the effect of economic sanctions imposed on 
Russia, which have apparently isolated the Russian equity market from the rest of 
WKHZRUOGDQGWULJJHUHGZLGHVSUHDGSRUWIROLRRXWÀRZVIURPWKHPDUNHWRUD³ÀLJKW
WRTXDOLW\´SKHQRPHQRQIUHTXHQWO\REVHUYHGGXULQJHPHUJLQJPDUNHWVFULVHV
Our results are in line with the evidence presented in Castagneto-Gissey and 
1LYRUR]KNLQZKRORRNDWWKH³GHFRXSOLQJ´RIWKH5XVVLDQHTXLW\PDUNHW
LQWKHDIWHUPDWKRIWKH8NUDLQLDQFULVLVRQDFRXQWU\E\FRXQWU\EDVLV6LPLODUO\
WR RXU UHVXOWV WKHVWXG\ ¿QGV D VWURQJ GHFUHDVH LQ LQWHUGHSHQGHQFH EHWZHHQ
WKH5XVVLDQHTXLW\PDUNHWDQGRIPDMRUGHYHORSHGIURQWLHUDQGHPHUJLQJ
markets.13 Using a longer sample period, our results show that the correlation 
ZLWKWKH%5,&DQG(PHUJLQJ0DUNHWVJURXSVDVDZKROHGHFUHDVHGVLJQL¿FDQWO\
providing further support to the evidence of tangible effects of Western sanctions 
on the Russian equity market. 
Our results also reveal a strong positive correlation between the cumulative re-
turn of the Russian equity index and the synchronicity of the Russian market with 
WKH:RUOG,QGH[7KHV\QFKURQLFLW\RIWKH06&,5XVVLDLVDOVRQHJDWLYHO\FRUUH-
lated with the level of the idiosyncratic risk derived from the market model. Our 
UHVXOWVDOVRVHHPWRLQGLFDWHDVLJQL¿FDQWYDULDWLRQLQWKHGHJUHHRIWKH5XVVLDQ
stock market’s integration with the rest of the world, as the current decoupling 
of the Russian market had been associated with the appearance of trends similar 
WRWKRVHREVHUYHGLQWKH³SUHLQWHJUDWLRQ´SHULRGLQWKHHDUO\SDUWRIWKHSUHYLRXV
decade. This evidence is consistent with literature on the implications of partial 
VHJPHQWDWLRQVXSSRUWLQJWKHVW\OL]HGIDFWVWKDWPDUNHWVHJPHQWDWLRQVLJQL¿FDQW-
ly affects valuation of equities and that the premium of shares available to foreign 
investors is time-varying. 




ETF,14 ZKLFK WUDFNV WKH06&, (PHUJLQJ 0DUNHWV ,QGH[ GURSSHG WR 
 13 6RPH HYLGHQFH RI LQFUHDVHG LQWHUGHSHQGHQFH ZDV H[FOXVLYHO\ IRXQG LQ WKH%UD]LOLDQPDUNHW +RZHYHU
%UD]LODQG5XVVLDZHUHQRWDEO\DPRQJWKHWHQZRUVWSHUIRUPLQJPDUNHWVLQWKXVWKHLQFUHDVHLQFRUUHOD-
tion between these markets’ returns in the crisis period could be explained by the idiosyncratic downside risk 
factors occurring simultaneously across both markets as well as by similar exposure of both countries to the de-




tractive valuations in the Russian equity market, the choice of available invest-
PHQWVUHPDLQVOLPLWHGGXHWRWKHHFRQRPLFVDQFWLRQVLPSRVHGRQWKHFRXQWU\$V
a result, the decrease in co-movement of the Russian stock market with the rest of 
WKHZRUOGLVXQOLNHO\WRSURYLGHLQWHUQDWLRQDOLQYHVWRUVZLWKVXSHULRUGLYHUVL¿FD-
tion opportunities. On the other hand, the lifting of sanctions is likely to result in 
DODUJHSRUWIROLRLQYHVWPHQWVLQÀRZWRZDUGV5XVVLD
$V LW LV KDUG WR IRUHFDVW ZKHQ WKHVDQFWLRQV ZLOO EH OLIWHG WKHUHWXUQV RI
the Russian market in the medium-term could continue to be predominately driv-
en by idio syncratic news and the effective decoupling of the Russian market from 
the rest of the world is likely to persist.
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